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This report is a compilation of the findings and recommendations discovered pursuing the 
Naval Postgraduate School Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD 
(PASCC) Grant No. N00244-15-1-0028, for research entitled "Improving Security through 
International Biosafety Norms.” The focus of this project was the potential for a biological 
research laboratory accident to spark an epidemic, and become an international public health 
problem. We examined what norms and expectations nations should have of each other to 
maintain a biosafety infrastructure capable of preventing and mitigating consequences a 
catastrophic biocontainment failure. 
Most accidents in biocontainment laboratories are limited to the researchers involved and 
possibly their close contacts. While these accidents are unfortunate events that may have 
severe consequences for those directly affected, these incidents would not typically become 
matters of international concern. However, laboratory acquired infections (LAIs) with 
particularly transmissible pathogens, including non-circulating human influenza strains, Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), or engineered influenza strains could have consequences 
that go well beyond the laboratory, beyond borders, and could constitute a threat to national 
and global security. While there is a great deal of technical guidance for researchers and 
institutions to achieve high levels of safety, to train workers, and to foster a laboratory 
environment that holds safety as a priority, we found that there is a key piece is missing from 
the available guidance: national-level biosafety norms that could provide reassurance to other 
nations that consequential work is performed with appropriate and sufficient safety systems.  
It would be helpful on an international level to know that potentially consequential research 
took place in an environment where there are high standards for the work, such as for 
equipment maintenance, worker safety training, health monitoring, surveillance, and other 
myriad activities to help keep the researchers and the larger public safe, and that the nation has 
an adequate surveillance system in place to identify and limit potential outbreaks that could 
result from such accidents. Without such national-level norms and expectations for biosafety 
and interest in making sure that research institutions that perform potentially high-
consequence research adhere to those standards, there will remain insufficient incentives to 
commit the resources required to achieve high levels of biosafety in individual laboratories and 
institutions. Without these kinds of norms, nations will not have confidence that all necessary 
steps are being taken in other nations to prevent a high-consequence laboratory accident from 
occurring, or to limit its consequences. 
Developing and agreeing to international biosafety norms is more important now than ever. 
Powerful tools to manipulate genomes, including CRISPR, are being used in laboratories around 
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the world, and even in the citizen-science community; these powerful technologies could be 
intentionally or inadvertently used to produce pathogens that would be difficult for public 
health measures to control. Additionally, there has been an increase in national laboratory 
capacities around the world, partly a result of the increased attention to the International 
Health Regulations and the Global Health Security Agenda; countries no longer are expected 
ship their samples to other nations with more advanced laboratory capacity, they are expected 
to develop that capacity within the nation to handle work with potentially pandemic causing 
pathogens.   
Major findings of this year-long research project include the following:  
1. Through an empirical examination of all available international security and safety 
regulations and guidance related to biology, we found a gap related to the biosafety 
and governance of those pathogens that have increased potential to initiate an 
outbreak outside a laboratory with the potential to spread nationally or 
internationally, or even lead to a pandemic.  There is an extensive array of existing 
governmental mechanisms related to biology or infectious disease control, and we 
examined and summarized each, including the Global Health Security Agenda (2014), 
the International Health Regulations (2005), the Biological Weapons Convention, 
Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, and several dozen other agreements in our Synopsis of 
Biological Safety and Security Arrangements (published in July 2015).  We found that 
there is a major gap in international biosafety agreements and arrangements related to 
high-consequence accidents that could arise with contagious pathogens (either natural 
pathogens or synthetic pathogens that are research constructs or artifacts).  
 
2. Worldwide, there is a wide divergence of the quality and quantity of biosafety 
regulations. Pathogens which could result in a consequential laboratory accident are 
not adequately addressed by publicly available regulations. We performed case studies 
of the biosafety regulations of 10 nations: Brazil, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Kenya, 
Russia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Online database searches 
for government documents, websites, media reports, and biosafety reviews were used 
to identify existing biosafety guidelines for each assessed nation and identify regulatory 
agencies, laboratory staff training programs, and incident response and reporting 
requirements. (It should be noted that this research did not address the success of 
implementing the relevant legislation and regulations.) Additionally, information was 
collected regarding current notable research priorities, research and development 
investments, and global biotechnology rankings to provide a synthetic overview of each 
nation’s biological research capacity and interest and their existing investments in 
biosafety. Advanced or synthetic biology is not consistently addressed by national-level 
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biosafety policy, and funding information for biosafety was generally unavailable. This 
further demonstrates the need for a more uniformly agreed upon set of biosafety norms 
for especially consequential work.  
 
3. There is a stark need for more data to inform biosafety policy; very little research into 
biosafety research practices and equipment is being funded or performed. The need 
for data that describes laboratory incident/accident rates is well understood, and efforts 
are underway in the US government to set up a system modeled on the system used in 
the aviation industry. However, more information is needed to set policy in this area: 
procedural studies (such as the proper protocols to inactivate anthrax spores, studies to 
determine which equipment works best for a given protocol, and which personal 
protective equipment (PPE) works best to protect the laboratory worker); behavioral 
studies and human reliability studies to be done to best instill a safety culture in the 
laboratory, to develop the best training material, to inspect laboratories in such a way 
as to improve safety over time, and to promote safe practices in routinized biological 
laboratory environments.  In addition, comparative studies are needed for practices, 
engineering, laboratory set-ups, and equipment. 
 
Developing greater expectations that all nations are doing what they should to prevent 
contagious public health threats will require further action and buy in from international 
organizations such as the WHO, OECD, as well as other nations. The next steps for this effort 
should be to continue to raise awareness that these governance issues are important for 
international consideration, and to work towards buy-in amongst international biosafety 
experts. International norms for biosafety are almost certain to be instituted after a major 
laboratory accident crisis; if we wait for that time, measures put in place during a crisis may be 
an over-reaction or an inappropriate reaction to what is actually needed.  We should be 
forward-looking and put those protective measures into place to prevent such a catastrophe, 
now.   
This report marks the conclusion of the activities within this research grant. Through this year-
long research study the UPMC Center for Health Security (the Center) produced reports (A 
Synopsis of Biological Safety and Security Arrangements, and National Biosafety Systems Case 
Studies, which are provided as separate attachments), published an article in Trends in 
Microbiology (Cell Press), interviewed 21 international biosafety and security experts on the 




Summary of Deliverables Produced 
 
This report is a compilation of the findings and recommendations discovered pursuing the 
Naval Postgraduate School Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD 
(PASCC) Grant No. N00244-15-1-0028 to provide funding support for research entitled 
"Improving Security through International Biosafety Norms” and marks the conclusion of the 
activities within this research grant.  
The UPMC Center for Health Security proposed to investigate (1) Which biosafety norms are 
important components of a national biosafety program to improve security (2) How to build 
confidence among nations that research on high-consequence pathogens is being carried out 
safely in other nations and (3) What biosafety infrastructure is in place in a select group of case-
study nations?  
In furtherance of this research, the Center produced the following deliverables: 
 
1. A Synopsis of Biological Safety and Security Arrangements (provided as a separate 
attachment): This synopsis provided summaries of key international treaties, 
agreements, instruments, guidelines, multilateral engagement mechanisms, and 
information resources intended to guide national approaches to biosafety in research, 
clinical, and industrial laboratories. The major finding from this research was that there 
is a gap in international norms for biosafety; there are no clear expectations for how 
nations should protect against major laboratory accidents that could become an 
international problem. The synopsis was widely distributed to the Biological Weapons 
Convention Meeting of Experts (Geneva, August 2015) and Meeting of States Parties 
(Geneva, December 2015) and was described in remarks as a useful resource by the 
Department of State. 
 
2. Trends in Microbiology (Cell Press) article (provided in Appendix A): This article 
described the findings of the Synopsis of Biological Safety and Security in a Trends in 
Microbiology editorial published by Cell Press, a highly regarded scientific journal with a 
high impact factor. (Gronvall GK, Rozo M. Addressing the Gap in International Norms for 
Biosafety. Trends in Microbiology.23(12):743-744. Available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tim.2015.10.002)  
 
3. National Biosafety Systems Case Studies (provided as a separate attachment): This 
compilation of case studies examined current biosafety approaches and regulations for 
Brazil, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Kenya, Russia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and 
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the United States, in order to look for commonalities and differences. This effort is a 
first step towards the development of international biosafety norms. The major findings 
of this work was that while all nations examined do have some regulations having to do 
with biosafety, there are major gaps in the area of potentially consequential laboratory 
accidents and advanced biological techniques (i.e. synthetic biology) is largely not 
covered. Funding levels for biosafety were uniformly not available.  
 
4. Interviews with International Experts on Biosafety/Biosecurity (list of experts 
interviewed provided in Appendix B): Not-for attribution interviews with 21 experts in 
science, security, biosafety, as well as researchers who work in “high-consequence” 
areas were performed, in order to better understand existing biosafety norms, the scale 
of the problem of potentially consequential laboratory accidents, and possible 
mechanisms to govern this area, internationally. The interviews helped to set the stage 
for the July 28, 2016 meeting. 
 
5. International Biosafety Norms, Data Gaps, and the Future of Biosafety Meeting (list of 
meeting attendees provided in Appendix C): Meeting of international experts in 
biosafety, security, and governance was convened at the UPMC Center for Health 
Security on June 28, 2016. The findings from this meeting are included in this report; the 
major takeaways are that there remains a gap in international norms for biosafety; 
there are complicating issues internationally that will make the process of developing 
international norms difficult (different perspectives internationally about intellectual 
property and genetically modified organisms or GMOs); and that biosafety scholarship is 




The Problem of Consequential Accidents in Biocontainment 
Laboratories 
 
Most accidents in biocontainment laboratories are limited to the researchers involved and 
possibly their close contacts. While these accidents are unfortunate events that may have 
severe consequences for those who are affected, these incidents would not typically become 
matters of international concern. However, laboratory acquired infections (LAIs) with 
particularly transmissible pathogens, including non-circulating human influenza strains, SARS, 
or engineered influenza strains could have consequences that go well beyond the laboratory, 
beyond borders, and would constitute a threat to national and global security. It is the safety 
procedures surrounding these high-consequence pathogens, which have the potential to 
cause international spread, even the possibility of pandemics or national security crises, 
which were the focus of this project.  
High-consequence pathogens work requires not only careful attention and training of the 
researchers performing the work, but a system of biosafety training, engineered controls, 
monitoring, and a safety culture. However, not all laboratories are so equipped, staffed, 
supported, or have the necessary oversight mechanisms in place to safely conduct this work. 
Indeed, one of the major concerns about influenza gain-of-function of concern (GOFroc) 
research is that such GOF research will be performed elsewhere in the world, not in the few 
labs where it started which has the highest level of experience and safety systems.  New 
research laboratories that may start this kind of work may have far less robust safety systems, 
health monitoring, and experience.  
Consequential laboratory accidents have happened before, but thankfully with limited impacts 
to international human health: in 2003-4, there were multiple LAIs with SARS, but transmission 
was halted before the disease could spread widely. More recently, there have been a string of 
highly publicized laboratory accidents in the US that also, fortunately, did not significantly affect 
human health, but highlighted the potential for a laboratory accident to lead to additional 
infections and an international public health emergency. For example, at the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), decades-old glass vials were discovered which were later found to 
actually contain live variola (smallpox) virus. Smallpox was declared eradicated by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) in 1980, and all laboratories that held samples of the virus were 
supposed to destroy them or send them on to the WHO, to be held at the only 2 laboratories 
allowed to keep them—the CDC and a Russian laboratory. Given that many years had passed 
and these samples were not either transferred or disposed of, this incident was indicative of 
poor inventory management procedures. No one was exposed to the smallpox virus in the 
course of this incident.  In 2015, it was discovered that the US Army Dugway Proving Ground 
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shipped samples containing live anthrax to centers not registered to work with it. These 
samples were incompletely irradiated and some samples were determined to have live anthrax 
spores. The shipments involved every state and several countries. In addition to these incidents, 
there were recent potential exposures of anthrax and non-circulating influenza at the CDC. 
These incidents demonstrate that human error is a problem in the laboratory. Fortunately, 
there is a great deal of technical guidance for researchers and institutions to achieve high levels 
of safety, to train workers, and to foster a laboratory environment that holds safety as a 
priority. However, a key piece is missing from the available guidance: national-level biosafety 
norms that could provide reassurance to other nations that consequential work is performed 
with appropriate and sufficient safety systems. For example, it would be helpful to know that 
potentially consequential research took place in an environment where there are national 
standards for the work, including for equipment maintenance, worker safety training, health 
monitoring, surveillance, and other myriad activities to help keep the researchers and the larger 
public safe, and that the nation has an adequate surveillance system in place to identify and 
limit potential outbreaks that could result from such accidents.  
Without national-level standards and expectations for biosafety and interest in making sure 
that research institutions that perform potentially high-consequence research adhere to those 
standards, there will remain insufficient incentives to commit the resources required to achieve 
high levels of biosafety in individual laboratories and institutions. Without these kinds of norms, 
nations will not have confidence that all necessary steps are being taken in other nations to 
prevent a high-consequence laboratory accident from occurring, or to limit its consequences.  
The determination that there is no nation-level guidance for biosafety was made empirically, 
through an examination of key international treaties, agreements, instruments, guidelines, 
multilateral engagement mechanisms, and information resources intended to guide national 
approaches to biosafety in research, clinical, and industrial laboratories. The Synopsis of 
Biological Safety and Security Arrangements, produced through this project, summarizes the 
benefits and limitations of all of these agreements in promoting biosafety, and their individual 
contributions towards minimizing the global risk and consequences of laboratory accidents. 
Some of the agreements analyzed include the World Health Assembly 58.29, the International 
Health Regulations (2005), the Global Health Security Agenda (2014), the Biological Weapons 
Convention, The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction, and many other agreements. Though there is an extensive array of existent 
governmental mechanisms related to biology, biosafety is a major gap. There remains a need 
for international norms for the biosafety and governance of those pathogens that have 




Considering the pace and progress of biotechnology, the lack of international norms for 
national biosafety in high-consequence pathogen research is concerning. Taking steps to 
develop internationally agreed-upon standards for biosafety for work with highly contagious 
organisms has the potential to provide reassurance to other nations that scientific research is 
performed safely, and that a laboratory acquired infection may be caught before developing 
into a pandemic.  
 
Biosafety comparisons, worldwide  
By describing a variety of biosafety governance approaches in these nations, we hoped to find 
areas of commonality which could be further developed into international norms. For that 
reason, we examined the governmental policies and regulations for biosafety in research 
laboratories in the nations of Brazil, China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Kenya, Russia, Singapore, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries were chosen in order to reflect 
geographical diversity and diversity in GDP and science base.  Online database searches for 
government documents, websites, media reports, and biosafety reviews were used to identify 
existing biosafety guidelines for each assessed nation and identify regulatory agencies, 
laboratory staff training programs, and incident response and reporting requirements. 
Additionally, information was collected regarding current notable research priorities, research 
and development investments, and global biotechnology rankings to provide a well-rounded 
overview of each nation’s biological research capacity and interest and their existing 
investments in biosafety. It should be noted that this research did not address the success of 
implementing the relevant legislation and regulations. 
We found that all case study nations had national biosafety guidelines and regulatory bodies 
responsible for oversight and compliance. Nonetheless, information availability was extremely 
variable, making comparisons difficult. The quantity and quality of information available varied 
widely between countries, which may be due to differences in scope or transparency of the 
biosafety programs or due to differences in priorities for biosafety regulation. The incentives 
behind biosafety regulation are varied, ranging from agricultural development to infectious 
disease control to biotechnology investments. National-level research priorities contributed 
significantly to the emphasis placed on developing biosafety legislation and oversight. It is 
therefore possible that there are resulting gaps in regulation for non-priority areas.  
Important for consideration of potentially high-consequence laboratory accidents in the future, 
we found that advanced or synthetic biology is not consistently addressed by national-level 
biosafety policy. Some nations have very strict regulatory policies for advanced or synthetic 
biology, and others only address it in a limited capacity or from a very specific perspective (e.g., 
genetically modified crops). Finally, funding information for biosafety was generally unavailable. 
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The lack of information about funding may be a function of transparency, but it also could be 
that biosafety is incorporated into larger budgets and not “called out” as a separate item. 
Additionally, the biosafety funding may be spread across a number of governmental agencies 
rather than being a single budget item. 
This project provided essential ingredients towards developing international biosafety norms 
for high-consequence research; a synopsis of biosafety-related international agreements that 
exposed the gap in biosafety norms for high-consequence research; case studies which 
demonstrated variability in biosafety requirements on the national level; and considerations 
from an international group of biosafety and security experts about important components of 




International Biosafety Norms, Data Gaps, and the Future of Biosafety 
(Meeting) 
 
A meeting of biosafety, national security, and governance experts was held at the UPMC Center 
for Health Security’s offices in Baltimore, MD, on June 28, 2016. Meeting attendees (listed in 
Appendix C) discussed whether and/or how nations may have common expectations regarding 
the biosafety practices of other nations, when engaged in research that has the potential to 
lead to international spread. In addition, they discussed how data gaps for biosafety and 
biosafety practices may be filled, as a lack of data has been blamed for biosafety lapses as well 
as policy development difficulties (such as for gain-of-function research); and to discuss the 
future needs and priorities for biosafety, in the face of a changing research and biotech 
landscape.  
 
The meeting agenda (Appendix D) was informed by the other deliverables from this research 
effort, such as the survey of available international mechanisms that influence biosafety 
(published July 2015); case studies of national biosafety systems to determine what elements 
are in common (published July 2016); and interviews with experts in science, security, 
biosafety, as well as researchers who work in “high-consequence” areas (as captured in the 
meeting slides, found in Appendix E). 
 
Findings drawn from the discussion included the following: 
1. There was general agreement that the premise of the meeting was sound. There is a 
need for norms and expectations on a national level to promote biosafety in research 
laboratories, in order to prevent an internationally consequential accident with a 
contagious pathogen.  
 
2. Defining terms and concepts clearly, and for an international audience, is an important 
step towards international norms to protect against high-consequence laboratory 
accidents. The focus of this meeting was a specific, internationally consequential result 
of a biosafety lapse in a research laboratory. Separating this issue from other more 
general laboratory concepts will be important. Even terms such as “biosafety” and 
“biosecurity” can be challenging to use for communication in an international context, 
and require concisely framed definitions and words. Biosafety is defined by the WHO as 
the containment principles, technologies, and practices that are implemented to 
prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release; 
biosecurity refers to the institutional and personal security measures designed to 
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prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release of pathogens and toxins. 
However, in some languages, the words for biosafety and biosecurity are essentially the 
same, and in French, the terms that are used for these concepts are confusing: 
biosûreté for biosecurity and biosécurité for biosafety.  
  
3. Separating international discussions about the safety of contagious pathogen research 
from other complicating biosafety issues will be a challenge; internationally controversial 
issues including intellectual property, the precautionary principle, and regulation of 
genetically engineered organisms will inevitably complicate those discussions. For much 
of the world, biosafety and biosecurity are related to the control and regulation of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The US has a much more pro-actionary 
approach to GMOs compared to European nations, as well as Europe-influenced 
nations; thus, regulatory regimes for biosafety around the world reflect these 
differences. The US regulates “recombinant DNA” manipulation within laboratories, but 
not nearly as strictly as GMO-centered regulatory regimes.  
 
4. Given the difficulty in establishing international norms for biosafety in the absence of an 
accident-induced epidemic, non-governmental organizations may have an unusually 
important role to play in making this an issue that deserves attention. Similar to the role 
that NTI has played in the nuclear security world, an NGO that prioritizes international 
harmonization of biosafety standards, to create acceptable norms, promote them, and 
evaluate nations for compliance could help this issue receive more attention.  In fact, 
historically the establishment of international norms often arises through or is catalyzed 
by the work of civil society.  
 
5. Many biosafety protections are focused on individual laboratory workers, but the 
benefits that we were discussed in our meeting were focused on the safety of the 
community outside the lab, including national or even international communities. There 
is a need for safety norms that address both populations, and for clarity in addressing 
the population threat.  
 
6. Should the strategy pursued by the US and other nations to give assistance to resource-
poor nations in biosafety be rethought? Theoretically, a biological laboratory incident 
that could result in a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC, under 
the IHR 2005) could come from anywhere where there is any biological research. 
However, the US prioritizes assistance based upon where there is an intersection of 
security needs and safety needs. A more expansive approach may be required to 




7. There have been several recent changes that make international biosafety and the 
recommendations that come from this meeting a more important issue now: 1. 
Emergence of biotechnologies and other tools to manipulate genomes which have the 
potential to produce pathogens which would be more difficult for public health measures 
to control and 2. An increase in national laboratory capacities around the world. The 
emerging technology issue is self-evident. Just a few years ago, CRISPR, the technology 
that allows genomes to be manipulated and changed more easily, was invented. It is 
already available as a kit for DIY Bio amateurs at a reasonable price.  The increase in 
national capacities is in partly a result of the increased attention to the International 
Health Regulations and the Global Health Security Agenda; instead of relying on 
countries to ship their samples to other nations with advanced laboratory capacity, 
there has been an intensive effort to boost laboratory capacity within countries.   
 
8. An underused lever for governance in the biological sciences is the pressure for scientists 
to publish in high end journals. Working on controls/standards for publication is an 
opportunity to push for increased controls for biosafety for dealing with especially 
consequential research, and efforts should be made to consider how this lever can be 
productively used to enhance safety.  
 
9. There is a great need to generate biosafety data. The need for laboratory 
incident/accident data is well understood; efforts are underway in the US government 
to improve the data surrounding these safety issues. In addition, there is a need for 
procedural studies (such as the proper protocols to inactivate anthrax spores, which 
equipment works best for a given protocol, which personal protective equipment (PPE) 
works best to protect the laboratory worker. There are innovations that could make a 
difference– in engineering, and behavior, to improve the safety of the laboratory. There 
are behavioral studies – also known as studies on Human Reliability and performance - 
to be done to best instill a safety culture in the laboratory, to develop the best training 
material, to inspect laboratories in such a way as to improve safety over time, and to 
promote safe practices in routinized biological laboratory environments. In addition, 
comparative studies are needed for practices, engineering, laboratory set-ups, and 
equipment. 
 
10. There is a need for more biosafety research to be performed; the type of scholarship 
needed for generating biosafety data may not require a separate biosafety PhD or 
Master’s program. The elements for what is needed can be found in other disciplines, 
including occupational safety, management science, or psychology. However, the 
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necessity is funding. Right now, this work isn’t being funded so it is not being 
performed.  
 
11. Incident and accident reporting will only work if it is anonymous. Universities and 
research institutions are generally averse to reporting incidents, particularly when they 
can bring a great deal of negative publicity to the institution.  
 
12. Defining a “near miss” biological incident so that it is clear to all who might need to 
report one is an important task. There are a variety of interpretations for what 
constitutes a potentially avoided accident in a biological laboratory. It will be important 
to define this in such a way as to promote learning from the event. Also, if 
biocontainment was not actually breached (i.e., there were redundant systems that did 
not fail) that should be noted in the reporting language, so as to not provoke undue 
alarm.  
 
13. The World Health Organization (WHO) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) may be institutions situated to put forward international norms for 
a broader community of nations, as the health and economic consequences are within 
their purview. With funding, such an effort would have the imprimatur of an 
international body and may thus be more likely to be received better on an 
international scale.   
 
14. A more formal process for developing emerging biosafety standards could lead to 
greater expectations of safety. Currently, biosafety guidelines for emerging laboratory 
techniques (such as CRISPR) or for emerging viruses (such as Zika) are developed 
through an informal collaboration of biosafety officers and experts. This informal 
process could become more formalized within the biosafety community earlier in the 
research process and include publication of results that could be widely disseminated in 






Recommendations for future work 
 
There are 3 broad categories to be pursued for future work, to support the development of 
international norms for biosafety.  
 
1. Engage international partners. Potential international partners including the WHO, 
OECD, or UN should be engaged to formally consider the importance of this issue. 
Develop a plan to discuss it in the community of nations, with the ultimate goal of 
developing international biosafety norms for work that could have potential to lead to 
international spread of infectious disease. We have demonstrated empirically that this a 
gap in international agreements, but this will need to be accepted  and discussed in 
international meetings of experts (including biosafety association meetings), and in 
meetings sponsored by an broadly respected and known international organization.   
 
2. Develop a biosafety research agenda. There is general agreement among experts that 
there is not enough data in biosafety to inform policymaking. A next step would be to 
report on exactly what kinds of data are required first, to develop a prioritized research 
agenda, to determine what kinds of organizations should perform the research, and to 
recommend what organization(s) should be funding the research. 
 
3. Initiate a process to develop consensus standards for biosafety when needed. 
Currently, biosafety guidelines for emerging laboratory techniques (such as CRISPR) or 
for emerging viruses (such as Zika) are developed through an informal collaboration of 
biosafety officers and experts. A better solution would be to set up an expert committee 
to publish a series of consensus papers on biosafety topics. Such a board could be 
activated upon short notice when new techniques/virus(es) are to be incorporated into 












Gigi Kwik Gronvall1,* and
Michelle Rozo1
There is currently a lack of national-level
norms for biosafety. Considering that a
laboratory accident involving a contagious
pathogen could have long-term conse-
quences that extend beyond an individual
incident into the practice of science more
broadly, it is in the interests of scientists
everywhere that international norms are
developed.
For most research scientists, biosafety is a
local concern. There are procedures to
work safely in the laboratory that need to
be followed, as well as taught to incoming
students and post-docs. There are institu-
tional biosafety committees, which review
registrations for recombinant DNA work as
well as infectious agents, animal protocols,
and clinical trials. Many research institu-
tions also have biosafety ofﬁcers who pro-
vide advice on biological risks, and ensure
compliance with the relevant regulations
and guidelines. But, while most scientists
deal with biosafety locally within their insti-
tution, how biosafety is practiced, regu-
lated, and funded on an international level
should be a concern of every scientist. As
pathogens do not conﬁne themselves to
international borders, a laboratory accident
involving a contagious pathogen could
potentially have far-reaching effects around
the world – not only as a direct impact of the
breach of containment but on the overall
practice of science.
Most accidents in biological science lab-
oratories are limited to the researchers
involved and possibly their close contacts.
While these accidents are unfortunate
events that may have severe consequen-
ces for those directly affected, they
would not typically become matters of
international concern. However, labora-
tory-acquired infections (LAIs) with partic-
ularly transmissible pathogens, including
noncirculating human inﬂuenza strains,
the severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) coronavirus, or other contagious
pathogens, could have consequences
that go well beyond the laboratory. In large
part, it was these biosafety concerns that
fueled the decision by the US government
in early 2015 to pause funding for inﬂuenza
gain-of-function (GOF) research while





touched off the controversy in 2011–2012
with their development of a form of the
H5N1 avian inﬂuenza virus that was trans-
missible between mammals [1,2]. While
these researchers were widely acknowl-
edged to be experienced in working with
virulent strains and to have taken many
biosafety precautions, fears were raised
that such work could easily be replicated
in laboratories with less robust safety sys-
tems, health monitoring, or experience,
and could trigger a pandemic.
Unfortunately, these fears are merited:
biosafety is uneven throughout the world,
and almost always underfunded. The
costs to staff, train, retrain, and implement
good practices are often considered less
important than other costs, such as fund-
ing the research itself. Furthermore, a sys-
tem of detailing and reporting biosafety
issues to a national or international body
is often lacking. Biosafety breaches are
embarrassing for the laboratory workers
who made the mistakes, as well as for the
research institution, and so even if bio-
safety lapses are detected, they may not
be reported. The researcher may feel stig-
matized, especially if the relationship with
the supervisor and the institution is poor,
and a culture of best biosafety practices
has not been established. Therefore, how
often accidents occur, or result in direct
harm to the laboratory worker, is almost
completely unknown.
In recognition of the fact that individual
laboratory workers carry the most per-
sonal risk from LAIs, resources have
been committed to boost biosafety at
the local level. There is excellent guidance
available for researchers, laboratories,
and research institutions to adhere to
high biosafety practices, and provide bio-
safety professional training pertaining to
each individual discipline and type of
work. There are also standards classifying
pathogens at varying levels of biocontain-
ment [Biosafety level-1 (BSL-1), BSL-2,
BSL-3, and BSL-4] and what correspond-
ing engineering controls should be in place
to manage biorisks within a research insti-
tution, whether they pose risks to humans,
livestock, or plants. The World Health
Organization (WHO), the Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), the World Organization for Animal
Health (OIE), the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), profes-
sional societies [including the American
Biological Safety Association (ABSA),
European Biological Safety Association
(EBSA), and Asia Paciﬁc Biosafety Asso-
ciation (A-PBA)] aim to bring technical
information to practitioners, enhance
laboratory safety practice, and promote
biosafety standards.
However, while there is an abundance of
information for individual researchers and
institutions to work in biological systems
safely, there is much less guidance at the
international level. There are no interna-
tional norms that would govern biosafety
precautions with particularly dangerous
pathogens, or detail how much nations
should be spending on biosafety oversight
as a proportion of research funding, or
describe what components of biosafety
systems are essential for oversight. Fur-
thermore, there is a dearth of cross-
disciplinary considerations, for example
concerning those laboratory workers
who deal with animal health as well as
food safety. To come to this troubling
conclusion, we performed an extensive
analysis of key international treaties, agree-
ments, instruments, guidelines, multilateral
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identiﬁed the beneﬁts and limitations of
each in promoting biosafety, and how they
contribute towards minimizing the global
risk and consequences of laboratory
accidents.
For example, among the international
arrangements which directly concern bio-
safety and biosecurity is the 2005 World
Health Assembly (WHA) Resolution 58.29
on Enhancement of Laboratory Biosafety.
This resolution urges WHO Member
States (which include all members of
the United Nations except Liechtenstein)
to adhere to principles that would
increase biosafety. However, there is no
assessment of whether the WHA guid-
ance has been adopted by any Member
State, or that sufﬁcient funds have been
committed to training, equipment, and
other resources and infrastructure
required in order to maintain safe and
productive laboratories. There is no inde-
pendent mechanism to monitor adher-
ence to principles through reporting or
external review, and countries do not
need to report on their adherence to the
resolution. More importantly, the docu-
ment does not provide guidance for
implementing a national biosafety sys-
tem, such as how to develop training
standards, designate governmental reg-
ulations, or enact a system for reporting
and monitoring LAIs. The proportion of
need for technical assistance by the
Member States also exceeds the capacity
of the WHO to provide.
Another example is the 2005 International
Health Regulations (IHR) [3], which
requires nations to detect and respond
to disease threats; functioning laborato-
ries are integral in that mission. The labo-
ratories that are part of the IHR
assessment are primarily medical and
public health laboratories which would
be used in the course of surveillance
and diagnosis of disease. Research,
industrial, and commercial laboratories
are not explicitly covered under IHR obli-
gations. Also, despite the requirement for
WHO Member States to have established
IHR core capacities by 2012, over 80% of
countries have either requested an exten-
sion or have not reported on these critical
capacities, so even the capacities of those
laboratories that are included are currently
unknown (http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/
pdf_ﬁles/EB132/B132_15-en.pdf?ua=1).
In response to the poor implementation
rates of the IHR 2005 standards, the
United States, along with 30 countries
and international organizations, put forth
the Global Health Security Agenda in Feb-
ruary of 2014, which focuses attention on
implementing IHR standards in resource-
constrained countries. However, the bio-
safety issues associated with potentially
consequential research are not just in
such resource-constrained countries but
also in places that are at the leading
edge of technological development, so
the appropriate target may instead be
research centers in well-resourced
countries.
Considering the pace and progress of
biotechnology, the lack of international
norms for national biosafety programs is
concerning. To develop them, it is up to
biosafety experts, scientists, and their
professional associations to determine
what are the reasonable combinations
of biosafety activities and oversight mech-
anisms that should be standard from one
research-producing nation to another.
Without national-level standards for bio-
safety, and interest in making sure that
research institutions that perform poten-
tially high-consequence research adhere
to those standards, there will remain insuf-
ﬁcient incentives to commit the resources
required to achieve high levels of biosafety
in individual laboratories and institutions. It
is also in the interests of nations to encour-
age that these standards be developed
and promulgated: taking steps to develop
internationally agreed-upon standards for
biosafety for work with contagious organ-
isms has the potential to provide reassur-
ance to other nations that scientiﬁc
research is performed safely, and that
an LAI may be caught, and stopped –
before developing into a pandemic.
1UPMC Center for Health Security, Baltimore, MD 21202,
USA
*Correspondence: ggronvall@upmc.edu (G.K. Gronvall).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tim.2015.10.002
References
1. Imai, M. et al. (2012) Experimental adaptation of an inﬂu-
enza H5 HA confers respiratory droplet transmission to a
reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in ferrets. Nature 486,
420–428
2. Russell, C.A. et al. (2012) The potential for respiratory drop-
let-transmissible A/H5N1 inﬂuenza virus to evolve in a mam-
malian host. Science 336, 1541–1547
3. World Health Organization (2008) International Health Reg-











enemies, may serve as potent anti-
bacterial agents. Their speciﬁcity
for certain bacterial sub-species
limits their effectiveness, but allows
selective targeting of bacteria. Lu
and colleagues present a platform
for such targeting through alteration
of bacteriophages’ host speciﬁcity
by swapping speciﬁcity domains in
their host-recognition ligand.
Bacteriophages are viruses that propa-
gate in bacteria and usually kill them. Ever
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